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The claim by global trade modelers that the potential contribution to global 
economic welfare of removing agricultural subsidies is less than one-tenth of that from 
removing agricultural tariffs puzzles many observers. To help explain that result, this 
paper first compares the OECD and model-based estimates of the extent of the producer 
distortions (leaving aside consumer distortions), and shows that 75 percent of total 
support is provided by market access barriers when account is taken of all forms of 
support to farmers and to agricultural processors globally, and only 19 percent to 
domestic farm subsidies. We then provide a back-of-the-envelope (BOTE) calculation of 
the welfare cost of those distortions. Assuming unitary supply and demand elasticities, 
that BOTE analysis suggests 86 percent of the welfare cost is due to tariffs and only 6 
percent to domestic farm subsidies. When the higher costs associated with the greater 
variability of trade measures relative to domestic support are accounted for, the BOTE 
estimate of the latter’s share falls to 4 percent. This is close to the 5 percent generated by 
the most commonly used global model (GTAP) and reported in the paper’s final section.  
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In the debate over the multilateral trade negotiations under the WTO’s Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA), there has been much confusion over numbers. This is 
especially so when referring to farm subsidies. Measures of the size of those subsidies in 
developed countries are published each year by the OECD Secretariat as part of its 
regular monitoring and evaluation of agricultural policies of its member countries. 
Initially they were called producer subsidy equivalents, but since they are expressed as a 
percentage of the support-inclusive (rather than undistorted) value of production, they are 
now referred to as producer support estimates, their common acronym being PSEs. 
Developing country governments and development NGOs (non-government 
organizations) frequently point to the fact that the dollar value of the average PSE for 
developed countries has not fallen since the Uruguay Round negotiations began in 1986 – 
despite that round’s Agreement on Agriculture which was expected to reduce government 
distortions to world food markets. While that is true, protective high-income country 
governments have countered by stressing that there has been some progress in two 
respects: in the PSE when expressed as a percentage of gross farm receipts (the latter 
rising over time with inflation and with the volume of output); and in the proportion of 
the PSE that affects output as distinct from that part which is at least somewhat 
decoupled from production (Figure 1).  
The 2004 dollar value of the PSE, $280 billion, is the number that has received 
the most attention in recent debates over the Doha Round. And since the acronym is 
known to refer to producer subsidies or support, it is assumed by many that developing 
countries and other advocates of liberal agricultural markets should focus their attention 
on obtaining cuts in government subsidies paid to farmers in high-income countries. This 
focus has the rhetorical appeal of contrasting the ability of developed countries to pay 
such subsidies with the much more limited resources available to developing countries. 
Also jarring is the contrast between this wasteful largesse and the much smaller amount  2  
devoted to foreign aid by the same industrial country governments (less than $80 billion 
per year). Politically, this focus is potentially appealing to developing countries because it 
also implies large-scale farm policy changes are needed only in developed countries.   
Why, then, have economists and organizations such as the World Bank argued 
that even more important than direct producer subsidies are barriers to agricultural 
imports and therefore that, from the viewpoint of economic welfare and trade, it is import 
barriers that need to be targeted in the DDA – and in developing countries as much as in 
high-income countries? This question has been asked by numerous trade negotiators and 
their advisors seeking an intuitive understanding of the modeling result that suggests 93 
percent of the global cost of agricultural tariff protection and subsidies is due to tariffs 
and only 2 percent to export subsidies.
1 The purpose of the present paper is to provide 
such an explanation.  
At the outset it is helpful to recognize two things. The first is that the OECD 
estimates refer to the extent of support to farmers not only directly via producer subsidies 
from the treasury but also indirectly by propping up domestic prices via export subsidies 
and, far more importantly, import barriers. This is something the OECD has gone to great 
lengths to explain in its documentation (OECD 2005 and earlier issues), but some 
misconceptions remain. Secondly, what matters is how those various elements of support 
affect production, consumption and trade and thereby national economic welfare. It is the 
net impact on economic welfare globally and in developing countries that the World 
Bank uses as its main criterion for determining the relative importance of the various 
measures. To estimate that requires a multi-country model of the global economy that 
takes into account the size of the sectors being distorted, the price responsiveness of 
supply and demand in different regions, the extent to which distortions vary across 
commodities and countries, and the fact that production subsidies distort only production 
responses while border measures distort both production and consumption. 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Anderson and Martin (2005), drawing on the chapter in their subsequent edited volume 
by Hertel and Keeney (2006), as well as the earlier partial equilibrium study by Hoekman, Ng and 
Olarreaga (2004). Hertel and Keeney’s finding that 93 percent of the global welfare cost of agricultural 
support programs is due to import tariff barriers to market access (using a 2001 protection database) is very 
close also to the 89 percent finding of Diao, Somwaru and Roe (2001) who used a 1995 protection 
database.  3  
The paper first shows the relationship between the OECD’s PSEs on the one 
hand, and on the other hand the representation of the various agricultural interventions in 
the database used by global modelers. It then provides a back-of-the-envelope assessment 
of the welfare implications of global trade liberalization, before reporting in Section 3 the 
results from the full-blown computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, building on 
earlier work by Hertel and Keeney (2006). Those CGE results show the estimated effects 
of policies not only on developing country and global economic welfare but also on 
global agricultural trade and on agricultural incomes in both developed and developing 
countries.  
 
1. OECD vs GTAP measures of the extent of agricultural subsidies and trade 
distortions 
 
The OECD’s PSE is intended to provide a summary measure of the producer 
subsidy that would be equivalent to all the forms of support provided to farmers, 
including direct farm subsidies that may or may not encourage production domestically, 
as well as market price support provided by import tariffs and export subsidies. All three 
of those components of government assistance to farmers are disciplined under the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, and have become known as the “three 
pillars”.  
One element of the OECD’s PSE is that provided by market price support (MPS) 
measures. It is calculated by comparing domestic and border prices of like products so as 
to capture the total domestic market price effect of all trade distortions, including tariff 
and non-tariff import barriers as well as export subsidies.  The OECD also uses the price 
comparison method to calculate a CSE: the consumer subsidy equivalent of those 
measures. The CSE is negative in countries that raise domestic food prices via restricting 
imports and subsidizing exports, and would only be positive if a country had direct 
subsidies to food consumption significant enough to offset the effect of those trade 
measures in raising consumer prices.
2  
                                                 
2 In principle the PSE and CSE would also capture the effects of import subsidies and taxes or other 
restrictions on exports, but in practice these are not being used in OECD countries.  4  
The OECD’s PSE can be compared with the extent of the distortions inserted into 
global economic models used to calculate the economic welfare and other consequences 
of these (and non-agricultural) trade-distorting measures. For more than a decade now the 
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) at Purdue University has coordinated the 
compilation of a global database of trade and agricultural subsidy interventions by 
governments. This GTAP database has become the standard and is used in dozens of 
different models by hundreds of modelers throughout the world. The most recent and by 
far the most comprehensive release, which relates to 2001 policies, is Version 6 
(Dimaranan and McDougall 2005). It incorporates all three components of support for 
agricultural production -- producer subsidies, import tariffs and export subsidies – and 
thereby also the effect of the latter two on raising food consumer prices. 
How do the OECD’s PSE numbers compare with those in the most recent version 
of the GTAP database (that is, for 2001)?
3 To allow easy comparison, we present them in 
Table 1 on the same subsidy-equivalent basis as the OECD numbers. To do this, we 
estimate the domestic subsidy amounts in the GTAP database by adding the subsidies 
paid to output, inputs, land and capital. We compare this with the subsidy equivalents of 
border measures, which are calculated by multiplying the rate of assistance assumed in 
the GTAP database by the value of agricultural output.
4  
For domestic support in OECD countries we find that the OECD and the GTAP 
numbers are within 1 percent of each other (a total of $89 billion reported by the OECD 
compared with $90 billion in the GTAP database). This is not surprising because the 
OECD estimates are the source for that part of the GTAP protection database. To that 
                                                 
3 A side issue is how the OECD’s PSE compares with the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) that 
members notify to the WTO as part of their commitments under the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture. The AMS refers only to the domestic support pillar, and it excludes measures that are not 
subject to reduction commitments (so-called blue box and green box measures). For a comparison of the 
PSE and AMS methodologies, see Diakosavvas (2002). In 1999 (the most recent year for which there has 
been full notification to the WTO) the AMS was $88 billion for high-income countries and $2 billion for 
developing countries. The $88 billion comprises $52 billion from market price support and $36 billion from 
direct domestic subsidies. By contrast, the PSE for just OECD countries was $273 billion in that year. Of 
that latter amount, $182 billion was from market price support measures and only the residual ($91 billion) 
was direct domestic subsidies. That residual is further reduced, to $43 billion, when measures that are 
somewhat decoupled from production are excluded. Since those decoupled measures are not counted as 
part of the AMS, that $43 billion is comparable with the $36 billion notified to the WTO as that component 
of the AMS.  
4 For the purpose of this calculation, we assume in this section that domestic and imported farm products 
are homogeneous, so that a tariff equal to 20 percent of the value of imports will raise the price of domestic 
production by 20 percent.  5  
needs to be added domestic support to primary agriculture in non-OECD countries, which 
is another $7 billion in 2001 according to the GTAP database (Dimaranan and 
McDougall 2005, Ch.16b). These estimates are shown in row 1 of Table 1.  
For market price support provided through trade measures, the GTAP database 
relies on applied tariff rates including preferential rates where applicable, plus export 
subsidy notifications by members to the WTO Secretariat (Dimaranan and McDougall 
2005, Chs.16d and 16e). By contrast, the OECD relies on domestic-to-border price 
comparisons to capture the combined effect of all trade measures, both tariffs and such 
non-tariff barriers as quarantine restrictions. In Table 1 the cost to producers of having to 
pay higher prices for intermediate inputs that are subject to tariffs or export subsidies has 
been netted out of the gross benefits to downstream producers of market price support 
measures in the GTAP database.
5 
For primary agriculture in OECD countries, the two market price support 
estimates differ substantially – $46 billion in the GTAP database compared with $139 
billion in the OECD’s PSE estimate for 2001 (see first two columns of row 3 of Table 1). 
This is mainly because the GTAP method does not capture the protective effect of non-
tariff barriers (NTBs) such as Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) measures or other 
technical barriers to imports that may provide additional economic protection, in contrast 
to the OECD measure which is does. Such NTBs are still a major trade restriction despite 
GATT and WTO attempts to convert all non-tariff barriers to tariffs.
6 When direct 
subsidies are added to market price support the total support is the equivalent of a 22 
percent ad valorem subsidy equivalent, whereas the comparable rate for the OECD 
Secretariat’s estimate is 44 percent (which is equal to its Producer Support Estimate 
(PSE) of 31 percent of the support-inclusive value of production). That difference 
between the GTAP and OECD’s rates is very consistent with a recent estimate of the 
trade-restrictiveness of NTBs in OECD agriculture in recent years, which suggests tariffs 
account for just 52 percent of the total tariff equivalent of both tariffs and NTBs (Lee, 
Nicita and Olarreaga 2006).  
                                                 
5 This is a way of capturing the impact on net value added by primary factors of production instead of just 
on the gross value of output, paralleling the difference between the concepts of effective and nominal rates 
of protection (Corden 1971). 
6 Such NTBs are appropriately left out of Doha modeling analyses, since those NTBs are not part of the 
WTO negotiations in this round.  6  
It is necessary to go beyond primary agriculture, however, when evaluating the 
consequences of reforms under WTO. This is because the WTO negotiations on 
agriculture involve potential liberalization of a wide range of processed agricultural 
products as well. In OECD countries domestic subsidies are not paid to processed 
agricultural products, but the extent of border protection to processing activities is 
substantial – even after netting out the effect on processors’ costs of having to pay higher 
than border prices for many primary agricultural product inputs.
7 According to the GTAP 
database, in 2001 that assistance amounted to $198 billion, which is greater than the 
estimated $136 billion in total support to primary agriculture for that year (final row of 
Table 1).
8 
The remaining important element to consider is the market price support provided 
to the agricultural and food sectors of non-OECD countries. At $76 billion for primary 
agriculture plus $82 billion for food processing, this support is a substantial addition to 
the support through import barriers of $46 billion provided to OECD agriculture and 
$198 billion to OECD processed food (row 2 of Table 1). But there are almost no export 
subsidies in non-OECD countries (row 3 of Table 1), further increasing the prominence 
of market access.  
In summary, the OECD and GTAP databases are very similar in their estimates of 
the extent of direct support to farmers in OECD member countries (columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 1); but the GTAP database also includes support via the food processing sector in 
those countries plus the support to both sets of activities in non-OECD countries. In total, 
the GTAP database suggests only 19 percent of the dollar value of the transfers to those 
producers from taxpayers and consumers is in the form of domestic support and only 6 
percent comes via export subsidies (see final column of Table 1).
9  
                                                 
7 Again this follows the effective protection concept mentioned above in footnote 5. 
8 As well, any given nominal protection rate for agricultural processing activities delivers a higher rate of 
effective protection and hence a greater welfare cost than the same nominal protection to primary 
agriculture, other things equal. This is because of the difference in value added shares of output (VASO) in 
the two sets of activities. According to the GTAP model, VASO is 32 percent in processing and 45 percent 
in primary agriculture in OECD countries, while in non-OECD countries the difference is even greater: 24 
percent compared with 54 percent, making for global averages of 30 and 50 percent, respectively. 
9 The value of the transfer to producers via export subsidies, as reflected in the GTAP database, is estimated 
at $28 billion globally (row 3 of Table 1). This includes not just the budget cost of export subsidies ($4.4 
billion in OECD and $0.5 billion in non-OECD countries) but also the transfer from domestic consumers to 
producers, because export subsidies raise consumer prices as well as producer prices.  7  
That is not the end of the story, however. What matters is how those policy 
measures affect economic welfare, to which we now turn.  
 
2. Relative importance of the three pillars in a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the 
global welfare cost of these distortions 
 
To assess the importance of each type of distortion for the overall welfare costs of 
protection, we need to take into account not only of the magnitude of the support under 
each pillar, described above, but also the ways in which the support is provided and the 
variation in the rates of distortion across commodities and countries. In examining these 
aspects, we focus in this section on the simplest back-of-the-envelope calculation of the 
welfare effects of these distortions, in an attempt to provide further intuition behind the 
more-complex CGE model results reported in the following section.  
The back-of-the-envelope model is depicted in Figure 2 in the case of a net 
agricultural importing region. As shown by Martin (1997), the welfare impacts generated 
by CGE models can be identified with the traditional partial equilibrium Harberger 
welfare triangles of waste in production and consumption.
10 Using the price wedges 
between border prices and producer prices induced by each of the three pillars of 
agricultural support, described above, one can obtain the relative contribution of each 
policy measure to the economic welfare cost of total intervention by assuming values for 
the price elasticities of aggregate supply and demand for agricultural products.  
When changes in the level of one instrument affect the volumes passing over a 
related distortion – whether in the same market or in a related market – the allocation of 
the effects between measures needs to recognize that the measured impact of each policy 
instrument is path-dependent. Allocation procedures such as in Huff and Hertel (2000) 
deal with this problem by changing each distortion incrementally along a path from the 
original distorted situation to an undistorted equilibrium. This approach allows us to fully 
allocate the total gain from reform into its individual components.  
 
                                                 
10 For individual countries, terms-of-trade changes must also be taken into account, but these net out at the 
global level.   8  
2.1 Trade measures are costly also to consumers 
 
Figure 2 exposes the fact that domestic support measures only accrue to the 
producer side (triangle adc), while market price supports (induced by tariffs and export 
subsidies) distort the consumer and producer side of the market (triangles cdf and hij). If 
the elasticities of demand and supply were equal, that means the welfare cost of a given 
tariff or export subsidy would be twice as great as that from a domestic subsidy applied at 
the same rate.
11 Consistent with Huff and Hertel (2000), we specify the total distortion to 
production resulting from border measures and domestic subsidies as creating a welfare 
triangle of losses on the production side, and partition this total between the two on the 
assumption that the two policies are reduced (or increased) in parallel. 
For the OECD countries, the $90 billion in domestic support to producers 
represents 13.5 percent of the value of their agricultural output at market prices. The rates 
of market price support are 17.0 percent from OECD import tariffs and 3.3 percent from 
export subsidies in agricultural and food production (Table 2). Using these rates and 
assuming unitary
12 elasticities of demand and supply, the total welfare cost of agriculture 
protection in OECD countries is calculated at $87 billion, from which 8 percent is 
induced by domestic support, 11 percent by export subsidies, and 81 percent by import 
tariffs. Using the same process for non-OECD countries, we calculate the cost of 
protection to producers at $42 billion, from which barely 1 percent is attributed to 
domestic support and export subsidies so almost all is attributed to market access 
measures. These back-of-the-envelope calculations yield a world total cost of protection 
in agriculture of $129 billion, of which 6 percent is attributed to domestic support, 8 
percent to export subsidies and 86 percent to market price support (Table 3).   
 
2.2 Variations in rates of assistance add to welfare costs 
                                                 
11 As well, as pointed out in note a of Table 1, over half of all domestic support globally is at least 
somewhat decoupled from production. Even though we believe that this decoupling reduces the extent to 
which domestic subsidies distort production, this is taken into account to only a limited degree in global 
CGE models. (In the GTAP model, decoupling is incorporated to the extent that payments to land distort 
output less than other factor payments given that land is specific to the agricultural sector in the 
model.)Thus, if anything, CGE models should overstate the contribution of domestic support measures to 
the total welfare cost of protection. Our BOTE analysis also ignores decoupling and similarly overstates the 
contribution of domestic support to the overall cost of protection. 
12 The choice of unit elasticities is quite arbitrary. For our interest in the relative importance of different 
barriers, it is only the relative magnitude of supply and demand elasticities that is relevant.   9  
 
Another important factor that must be taken into account is the variation in 
agricultural assistance rates across commodities and across countries. The average 
numbers discussed above would be appropriate if protection and subsidy rates were the 
same across countries. However, the cost of protection rises with the square of the tariff, 
so a situation where one commodity has high protection and another has low protection is 
more costly than one where each commodity has the (appropriately weighted) average 
tariff rate.  
We illustrate in Figure 3 the point using a diagram for the case of a tariff. The 
import demand curve is downward sloping, and a world price of 100 is given by the 
horizontal line at that price. We compare the welfare costs of two tariffs – a tariff of 50 
and one of 150 – with the costs associated with their average, a tariff of 100. With the 
tariff of 50, the domestic price of the imported good is 150 and the economic cost of the 
tariff is shown by the area a. At the average tariff of 100, the economic cost is given by 
the area a+b+c; and with a tariff of 150, the domestic price of imported goods is 250 and 
the cost of the tariff is a+b+c+d+e+f. Examination of the figure shows that the average of 
the costs of the two tariffs is greater than cost of the average tariff by the area f. For this 
example, the quantitative difference is substantial, with the estimated average cost 
associated with the two tariffs being 25 percent higher than the cost of the 100 percent 
tariff.
13 
To obtain an indication of the relative importance of the three pillars when the 
variability of each form of assistance is taken into account, we use a procedure based on 
analysis of variance. We first characterize the cost of protection using the standard 
relationship: 
Ci    = ½ηiwi .t
2 
where Ci  is the cost of the tariff; ηi is the elasticity of demand  or supply (depending upon 
which is being distorted); wi is the value of production or consumption at undistorted 
prices; and  ti is the tariff rate.
14 Since we are only interested in the extent to which the 
variability of tariffs affects the relative importance of the different forms of support, we 
                                                 
13 This is calculated by comparing the cost of the 100 percent tariff (1/2.s.t
2, where s is the slope of the 
demand curve, so C=1/2.s.1) with the average cost of the two tariffs (1/2.s.(0.5
2+1.5
2).  
14 This ignores the cross-product terms that may be important (see Martin 1997), but can only be adequately 
accounted for in a complete model as in Section 3 below.   10 
ignore the purely proportional ½ term. To simplify further, we assume that the ηi terms 
are equal for all commodities so that this, also, becomes a purely proportional term that 
will not affect the ratio of the cost of protection with and without the variance terms. 
Under these assumptions, we can decompose the costs of protection into an element 
associated with the cost of protection at a uniform rate equal to the average observed rate 
of protection, and a component due to the variability of protection rates around this 
average. This total cost, C is given as:  
 
(1)   [ ]




w C  
where the summation is over commodity (i) and country/region (r). 
From this analysis, we find that the cost of protection provided by agricultural 
tariffs is 8.1 times what it would be if all protection were provided through a tariff equal 
to the weighted average tariff rate. Using the same methodology, the cost of domestic 
subsidies must be raised by a factor of 5.4. The corresponding multiplier for export 
subsidies is 13.9. The greater variability of border measures relative to domestic support 
is a factor that increases the relative cost of these trade barriers. 
If we were to adjust the estimated cost of tariff protection to account for this 
variability, we would find that the resulting total estimated cost would be 8 times larger 
than if all protection were provided at the average observed rate. When we take the shares 
of each pillar in the resulting adjusted total we find them to be: 4 percent for direct 
domestic support, 13 percent for export subsidies, and 83 percent for tariffs.
15  
 
2.3 Second-best effects can alter the welfare contribution of export subsidies 
 
A feature of the above back-of-the-envelope results, compared with those in 
Section 3 obtained from CGE models, is the much greater importance of export subsidies 
relative to market access and domestic support barriers. This is due to the ability of CGE 
models to take into account second-best welfare interactions that we cannot easily include 
in back-of-the-envelope calculus. World trade is greatly reduced by a wide range of 
distortions, almost all of which diminish trade. Export subsidies, by contrast, increase 
                                                 
15 The welfare share contribution of each of these three pillars is remarkably consistent even when 
production or value added weights are applied to compute the variances of these policies, changing by less 
than one-twentieth.  11 
trade. When, for instance, an importing country with a tariff is induced to purchase more 
inputs by the provision of another country’s export subsidy, each additional unit of 
imports inside the importing country costs less than it would in the absence of that export 
subsidy. This suggests one should expect a global CGE model’s estimate of the 
contribution of import market access restrictions to the welfare cost of agricultural 
policies to be somewhat above 83 percent, the lowest of the above back-of-the-envelope 
estimates.   
 
3. Relative importance of the three pillars in the GTAP Model’s estimate of their 
impact on global economic welfare, agricultural trade, and net farm incomes  
 
  How do those expectations compare with model-based estimates of the three 
pillars’ relative contributions to the global welfare cost of current agricultural distortions? 
The Diao, Somwaru and Roe (2001, p37) study provides estimates that imply an 89 
percent share of the total costs for import tariff market access, 10 percent for domestic 
support, and 1 percent for export subsidies, while the estimates from the World Bank’s 
recent analysis reported in Anderson and Martin (2005), drawing on results in Hertel and 
Keeney (2006) using their GTAP-AGR Model, are 93, 5 and 2 percent, respectively.
16 
These results have been replicated and added to by Anderson and Valenzuela (2005), 
who also find that the cost to non-OECD country welfare is even more heavily dependent 
on market access barriers than is the global cost, because export subsidies are only 
prominent in OECD countries and contribute to the welfare of non-OECD countries by 
lowering the price of their food imports. These results are summarized in the first three 
rows of Table 4. 
The middle row of Table 4 shows that import barriers have a far more important 
impact than do subsidies on global agricultural trade as well, accounting for 85 percent of 
the trade-reducing impact of the three measures. Domestic support measures explain the 
rest, apart from a small contribution of the opposite sign by export subsidies. Freeing all 
                                                 
16 This 5 percent relative contribution to global welfare corresponds to an upper bound estimate, as the 
GTAP database does not differentiate non-coupled to production payments, and the GTAP model partially 
restricts the use of land in alternative agricultural uses (see Dimaranan and McDougall 2005; Keeney and 
Hertel 2005).   12 
merchandise trade would raise the share of agricultural production that is traded 
internationally by one-fifth globally (from 9.6 to 11.7 percent), and by almost one-third 
for developing countries (from 7.7 to 10.2 percent), according to the GTAP-AGR Model 
used here (Anderson and Valenzuela 2005). 
Finally, what impact do those distortions have on net farm incomes (agricultural 
value added) in OECD and developing countries? Again using the GTAP-AGR Model, 
Anderson and Valenzuela (2005) estimate that the contribution of tariffs still dominates 
subsidies, but only just (54 percent – see bottom rows of Table 4). The reason that 
removal of domestic support would make so much more of a contribution to net farm 
income than to global welfare is because a non-trivial part of the effects of distortions on 
welfare and trade comes from the consumer side of the market, and that is absent in the 
case of domestic support measures.
17  
Given that it is farm and agri-business lobbying pressures that dominate 
agricultural trade negotiations, this greater importance of subsidies to non-OECD farmers 
helps explain the strong emphasis by developing countries in subsidy cuts even though, 
as a net food-importing group, they would lose from export subsidy removal. A further 
part of the explanation is that developing country governments, knowing that they are 
less capable of financing farm subsidies than are rich countries, are unwilling to suffer 
the political pain of being more disciplined in their countries’ use of agricultural tariffs 




The above results on the relative importance of market access, domestic support, 
and export subsidies as sources of global economic costs of agricultural protection are 
important to understand, because they can influence the weight of effort trade negotiators 
put into liberalizing the three “pillars”. The intuition behind the model results is 
straightforward. Agricultural market access barriers are much more important than 
domestic subsidies because: (i) the amounts of support provided through market access 
                                                 
17 The relative impact of the three measures on net farm incomes differs across commodity and country 
groups, but Anderson and Valenzuela (2005) show that for each of the main farm product groups market 
access dominates.  13 
barriers – to agriculture and to processed food – in developed (and even more so in 
developing) countries are much greater than the supports provided through subsidies; (ii) 
trade barriers distort both production and consumption whereas domestic support only 
distorts production (and less so the more those measures are decoupled); and (iii) market 
access barriers vary much more across countries and commodities, and hence generate 
larger costs, than do domestic support measures.  
These results point to the importance of ensuring that market access is high on the 
Doha Development Agenda’s agricultural negotiations.
18 Recall, though, that the GTAP 
database does not include the tariff equivalent of non-tariff import restrictions such as 
technical barriers to trade. That means market access is even more important than the 
above model results imply, but it also means improving access requires not only tariff 
cuts but also stronger disciplines on non-tariff import restrictions. If the DDA can at least 
result in a lowering of bound agricultural tariffs down to or below applied rates, that will 
provide a much stronger base from which to seek a lowering of non-tariff barriers in the 
future.    
                                                 
18 This echoes the more-general point made by Snape (1987, 1991) that if multilateral trade negotiators 
focus just on reducing border measures, domestic subsidies will generally be of minor significance to trade 
because of their dependence on explicit treasury outlays that are subject to annual budget scrutiny.   14 
Appendix: Sensitivity analysis of results to choices of elasticities in the back-of-the-
envelope and GTAP-AGR models 
 
 
  All model results are dependent on the choices of model parameters, and this 
applies as much to the simplest of demand/supply models as to the most sophisticated 
CGE models. In this appendix we show how the key results on the relative importance of 
the “3 pillars” vary as we alter the domestic demand and supply elasticities in our back-
of-the-envelope model and the supply and trade elasticities (and hence implicitly the 
domestic demand elasticities) in the GTAP-AGR Model. 
  The results in Table 3, based on unitary price elasticities of domestic demand and 
supply, are reproduced in the middle of Appendix Table A, alongside which are the 
results when those elasticities are 50 percent higher or lower. While those large elasticity 
changes cause large differences to the welfare effects in dollar terms, they make almost 
no difference to the relative contribution of import market access barriers, which ranges 
from 84 to 89 percent. 
  The results in Table 4, based on the medium-run elasticities in the GTAP-AGR 
Model developed by Keeney and Hertel (2005), are reproduced in row 1 of Appendix 
Table B, below which are the results when the trade elasticities are increased by one-third 
(bringing them roughly into line with those in the World Bank’s LINKAGE Model – see 
Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe 2006, Appendix Table 12A.2) and/or when 
the implicit supply elasticities in the GTAP-AGR Model are doubled. Again these 
changes have very little impact on the relative contribution of import market access 
barriers, which ranges from 92 to 95 percent.  15 
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Figure 1: Agricultural producer support in high-income countries, by value, percent 
and type of support, 1986 to 2004 
 






























a The striped rectangle represents the portion of the PSE percentage that is due to 
payments to farmers based on area planted, animal numbers, historic entitlements, input 
constraints or overall farming income. The residual black area above it represents the 
portion due to payments based on output or input use or otherwise not classified. In 1986-
88 the former was 9 percent of the latter, and in 2002-04 it was 25 percent. 
 




















































































































Pcif =  20 
Table 1: Estimates of the extent of support to agriculture and food sectors, by region and policy instrument, 2001 
(US$ billion) 




agriculture    
GTAP database estimates 
of support to 
 primary agriculture 
 
GTAP database estimates 
 of support to 




















 of support to    
all countries’ 
agriculture and 
 food (% in 
brackets) 
               
Direct domestic subsidies  89  90 
b  7   97     0  0  0  97    (19%) 
  – Fully coupled to prod’n   37
a                 
Market price support (MPS)  139    46  76 122   198  82 280 402      (81%) 
   – Export subsidies 
c  na   3  1
  4   26
  0.1
  26  30      (6%) 
 – Import tariffs
 d  na    43  75 118   172  82 254 372      (75%) 
All support measures
e   228  136 83  219   198 82  280  499  (100%) 
a The portion somewhat decoupled from production refers to payments to farmers based on area planted, animal numbers, historic entitlements, 
input constraints or overall farming income. The fully coupled portion refers to payments based on output or input use or otherwise not classified.  
Even if all non-OECD domestic subsidies were fully coupled, that would still mean less than half [(37+7)/97= 45 percent] of domestic farm 
subsidization is fully coupled globally. 
 
b The domestic support is estimated from the value wedges between payments at agents’ prices and market prices in the GTAP database. These 
payments are collected by commodity and region in payments to final output, payments to factors, payments to domestic intermediate inputs, and 
payments to imported intermediate inputs. The GTAP-AGR Model allows us to identify from the GTAP database payments to land based on 
historical entitlements of $8 billion (Keeney 2005, p. 85).  
  21 
c Export subsidy market price support is calculated as the sum over all goods of the value of output at undistorted prices of good i in region r times 
the corresponding export subsidy rate of good i in region r, minus the sum of the value of each intermediate inputs used in industry i in region r 
times its corresponding export subsidy rate. 
 
d Import tariff market price support is calculated as the sum over all goods of the value of output i at undistorted prices in region r times the 
corresponding trade weighted tariff rate of good i in region r, minus the sum of the value of each intermediate input used in industry i in region r 
times its corresponding tariff rate. In deriving the import weights for making these calculations, intra-EU15 trade was excluded. 
 
e The value of OECD production of primary agriculture at undistorted prices in the GTAP database is US$614 billion, so $136b represents an ad 
valorem subsidy equivalent of 22 percent. The OECD Secretariat’s estimated value of production at farm gate prices is $653b plus $77b worth of 
direct payments based on output, and $228b of that sum of $730b is subsidies. Hence at undistorted prices the production value is $502b, so $228b 
represents an ad valorem subsidy equivalent of 44 percent. 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on OECD (2004) and the GTAP database Version 6 (see www.gtap.org).  22 
Table 2: Agricultural subsidies and applied tariffs, by region, 2001 
 
    ( p e r c e n t )  
 



















OECD countries  13.5  0.8  16.9    3.3  17.0 
Australia   2.9  0.0  1.0   0.0  9.1 
New Zealand   0.3  0.0  0.4   0.0  2.7 
United States   16.2  0.0  1.1   0.2  3.2 
Canada   10.6  0.0  1.3   0.0  13.6 
Mexico   8.8  0.0  10.7   0.0  12.2 
European Union (EU15)  17.7  4.4  7.4   8.6  17.9 
Switzerland-Iceland-Norway 39.8  4.2  29.5   3.9  31.4 
Other European members  10.7  0.0  6.2   1.4  17.0 
Turkey   3.1  0.2  15.9   1.6  18.0 
Japan   6.0  0.0  27.8   0.0  31.4 
Korea   3.6  3.3  146.4   0.0  26.1 
            
Non-OECD countries  0.7  0.0  14.9    0.0  17.5 
E. Europe & Central Asia  0.5  0.0  8.9   0.2  18.0 
Russia   0.6  0.0  5.1   0.0  16.7 
Other E. Europe & C. Asia  0.5  0.0  10.8   0.3  18.9 
East Asia & Pacific  0.0  0.0  32.9    0.0  19.8 
China   0.0  0.0  50.8   0.0  18.3 
Indonesia   0.0  0.0  1.8   0.0  9.0 
Other E. Asia & Pacific  0.0  0.0  16.8   0.0  22.9 
South Asia   3.0  0.0  17.8    0.0  50.9 
Bangladesh   0.1  0.0  6.3   0.0  19.7 
India   3.4  0.0  25.5   0.0  76.4 
Other South Asia  2.3  0.0  13.4   0.0  29.9 
Middle East & North Africa  0.0  0.6  10.3    0.0  16.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.2  0.0  9.3   0.0  21.3 
South Africa Custom Union  0.0  0.0  6.3   0.0  8.3 
Other Southern Africa  0.4  0.0  11.0   27.2  0.4 
Other Sub-Saharan Africa  0.1  0.0  10.4   0.0  24.5 
Latin America & Caribbean  0.4  0.0  6.7    0.0  11.1 
Argentina   0.0  0.0  4.7   0.0  7.6 
Brazil   1.3  0.0  2.4   0.0  8.6 
Other Latin America & Carib.  0.0 0.0  8.6   0.0  11.8  23 
 
a  Ratio of subsidies to the value of primary agriculture production at market prices. (That is, 
domestic support is estimated by measuring value wedges between payments at agents’ prices 
and at market prices.) These payments are by commodity and region to final output, factors of 
production, domestic intermediate inputs, and imported intermediate inputs.  
b Export subsidy rates are the ratio of subsidy payments over the value of exported commodities. 
Trade weights are used for aggregation. 
c Intra-EU15 trade is ignored in EU and world trade in calculating import weights. 
 d There are no domestic production subsidies on processed agricultural products. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from GTAP database 6.  24 
Table 3: Back-of-the-envelope calculation of the impact of agricultural and food 









 All  countries 
Direct domestic subsidies  7  0.5    8  (6%) 
Market price support  80  41    121  (94%) 
     Export subsidies  10  0.1    10  (8%) 
     Import tariffs  70  41    111  (86%) 
All support measures 
87 42 





Source: Authors’ calculation assuming unitary elasticities of domestic demand and 
supply  25 
Table 4: GTAP-AGR Model calculations of the impact of agricultural and food subsidies and tariffs on global economic 






































                
Contribution to economic welfare 
 (equivalent variation in income)     




OECD countries  6 5  78 0.2  -0.1  11 6 5  89  100 
Non-OECD countries  2  -10 84  -0.8  0.2 25  1  -10  109  100 
World  5 2  79  -0.1  0.0  14 5 2  93  100 
                     
Contribution to world agricultural 
trade (by value)  15 -2 55  2 -0 30 17 -2 85  100 
                     
Contribution to net farm incomes 
(agricultural value added)                  
% loss OECD countries  45  3 55  -1  -0.1 -2 44  3 53  100 
% gain Non-OECD countries  54 10  120  -16  -0.3  -68 38 10 52  100 
(% loss)World
a  42  -0.3 31  4  0 23 46  -0.3 54  100 
 
a There is an estimated global decrease in net farm income (or agricultural value added) of 6 percent as a result of removing agricultural and food 
subsidies globally, comprising an average loss of 22 percent in OECD countries and an average gain of 4 percent in non-OECD countries. 
Source: Authors’ calculations drawing on Anderson and Valenzuela (2005).  26 
Appendix Table A: Sensitivity analysis of the back-of-the-envelope results with 




a) Contribution to global economic welfare (in $US billion) 
 
   Supply  elasticity   
  0.5 1.0  1.5 
0.5  65 101  137 
1.0  93  129  165 
Demand 
elasticity 




b) Share of global welfare due to import market access (%) 
 
   Supply  elasticity   
  0.5 1.0  1.5 
0.5  86 85  84 
1.0  88  86  85 
Demand 
elasticity 
1.5  89 87  86 
 
 




  27 
Appendix Table B: Sensitivity analysis of CGE results using the GTAP-AGR Model with respect to trade and supply 
elasticities, 2001   
 
 (percent) 


































                
Contribution to global economic welfare 
 (equivalent variation in income) using: 
     




GTAP-AGR original parameters 
 
5 2  79  0 0  14  5 2  93  100 
Trade (Armington) elast. increased by 33% 
 
4 1  81  0 0  14  4 1  95  100 
Supply elasticities increased by 100% 
 
6 2  78  0 0  14  6 2  92  100 
Both trade and supply elasticities 
increased as above 
5 1  80  0 0  14  5 1  94  100 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations drawing on Anderson and Valenzuela (2005). 
 